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How Regime Complexes Enhance the Normative Legitimacy 








This theory note develops a theoretical approach that integrates the negative spillovers that 
international institutions often impose on each other into our thinking about their normative 
legitimacy. Our approach draws on the political philosophy of Rainer Forst which revolves 
around the right to justification. It suggests that regime complexes facilitate the break-up of 
institution-specific orders of justification by prompting invested actors to justify negative 
spillovers vis-à-vis each other. Thus, regime complexes enable more encompassing justifications 
of negative spillovers than stand-alone international institutions. Against this backdrop, we 
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“We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking 
measures to protect public health. Accordingly, (…) we affirm that the Agreement can and should 
be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public 
health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.” (World Trade Organization 
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2001, para. 4). This stipulation is the integral part of the “Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and public health” (Doha Declaration), unanimously adopted by the members of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) at their Ministerial Meeting on 14 November 2001.  
The Doha Declaration responds to the negative spillovers that the WTO TRIPS Agreement, by 
increasing prizes of and reducing access to essential medicines in less affluent parts of the world, 
imposes on global health (Sun 2004, 125–27). It results from a fierce battle between the holders 
of intellectual property rights on pharmaceuticals in the “Global North” and the importers of 
those products in the “Global South” (Drezner 2007, chapter 7). Within this battle, a transnational 
alliance of developing countries and public health NGOs brought the World Health Organization 
(WHO) to monitor closely how exactly TRIPS affects public health (t’Hoen 2003). The 
knowledge thus created by the WHO increased the pressure on the WTO to justify its regulations 
of intellectual property rights against the backdrop of public health concerns (Helfer 2009, 41–
42). The Doha Declaration responds to this justificatory pressure by linking one of the 
governance objectives of the WTO (protecting intellectual property rights) to the governance 
objective of the WHO (protecting public health). In doing so, it mitigates the negative spillovers 
that the WTO TRIPS Agreement imposes on public health. 
The interaction between WTO and WHO exemplifies that international institutions often create 
effects outside their own governance domains (Johnson and Urpelainen 2012). This theory note 
establishes why these effects impact their normative legitimacy. More precisely, it argues that the 
normative legitimacy of any international institution depends also on how it deals with the 
negative spillovers it creates. 
The note diverges in two important ways from the dominant approach to the normative 
legitimacy of international institutions: First, rather than treating international institutions as 
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stand-alone entities which address separate cooperation projects and operate in isolation from 
each other (Grant and Keohane 2005; Moravcsik 2004; Zürn 2004), it adopts the analytical 
perspective of the New Interdependence Approach (NIA), which conceives of international 
institutions as elements of larger institutional structures characterized by rule overlap (Farrell and 
Newman 2016, 716, 721–22). More precisely, it conceives of international institutions as 
embedded in regime complexes composed of international institutions that overlap in their 
memberships and regulatory competences without being coordinated by a hierarchical instance 
(Raustiala and Victor 2004). Second, rather than locating normative legitimacy in the ability of 
international institutions to realize clearly separable governance objectives (Keohane, Macedo, 
and Moravcsik 2009) or in the (democratic) quality of decision-making within single 
international institutions (Moravcsik 2004), the note conceives of normative legitimacy as 
residing in inter-institutional justificatory practices. By drawing on the right to justification (Forst 
2011, 2015), it conceptualizes normative legitimacy as emerging from “the justification of 
actions to those whom they affect according to reasons they can accept” (Williams 2009, 43; see 
also Steffek 2003). In short, the note combines a new analytical perspective on international 
institutions as embedded in regime complexes with a new approach to normative legitimacy as 
residing in inter-institutional justificatory practices.  
We reveal that, as stand-alone entities, international institutions can establish only partial orders 
of justification which revolve around their own governance objectives. Drawing on the NIA, we 
argue that any international institution is a key source of asymmetric power, because each 
international institution systematically privileges those collective actors and transnational 
alliances that pursue its own governance objective over collective actors and transnational 
alliances that pursue diverging governance objectives (Farrell and Newman 2016, 716). The 
WTO, for instance, systematically privileges those collective actors and transnational alliances 
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that exert justificatory pressure against the backdrop of its governance objective to liberalize 
trade over collective actors and transnational alliances that refer to diverging governance 
objectives, such as the protection of the environment and of labor rights (Steffek 2003, 268–70). 
Regime complexes, in contrast, facilitate inter-institutional and therefore more encompassing 
orders of justification. The process that led to the Doha Declaration exemplifies how the 
embeddedness of international institutions in regime complexes enables affected collective actors 
and the transnational alliances they may form to create political pressure against the backdrop of 
diverging governance objectives enshrined in overlapping international institutions.1 As elements 
of regime complexes, actors interacting within international institutions (e.g. the WTO) therefore 
face stronger political pressure to justify negative spillovers (e.g. on public health) than as if they 
would interact within stand-alone entities. In sum, regime complexes enable breaking open the 
partial orders of justification put in place by single international institutions. In that sense, they 
facilitate normative progress in global governance.2  
This theory note expands existing research on regime complexes which is hitherto primarily 
driven by the question of whether and in how far regime complexes constitute barriers or 
opportunities for effective global governance (Faude and Gehring 2017; Orsini, Morin, and 
Young 2013). By implication, it almost completely neglects questions of normative legitimacy 
(Alter and Raustiala 2018). However, two starkly contrasting arguments stand out: On the one 
hand, Eyal Benvenisti and George Downs (2007, 595–96) argue that the institutional 
fragmentation of global governance “operates to sabotage the evolution of a more democratic and 
egalitarian international regulatory system” and, in the end, yields “a regulatory order that reflects 
 
1 This argument applies to regime complexes that are composed of international institutions from at least two 
different international regimes. 
2 This assessment is made “in light of the imperfect present set of institutions” which makes the evaluation of its 
normative legitimacy “a task for normative non-ideal theory” (Follesdal 2016, 308). 
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the interests of the powerful that they alone can alter.” On the other hand, Jonathan Kuyper 
argues that the democratization of global governance should occur at the level of regime 
complexes because they empower weaker actors and enhance the realization of three core values 
of democratization: “equal participation”, “accountability”, and “institutional revisability” 
(Kuyper 2014a).  
Their starkly contrasting arguments notwithstanding, both contributions share the assumption that 
regime complexes clearly privilege specific groups of actors – either powerful states (Benvenisti 
and Downs) or weak states and non-state actors (Kuyper) – over others. We, by contrast, argue 
that regime complexes facilitate inter-institutional dynamics of justification which do not a priori 
benefit one clearly identifiable group of collective actors. Rather, they enable actors marginalized 
within the international institution producing negative spillovers to demand inter-institutional 
justifications.   
The note proceeds as follows: First, we establish that normative legitimacy in global governance 
is created not only within but also across international institutions. Second, we develop a new 
analytical perspective on normative legitimacy in global governance which conceives of 
international institutions as embedded in regime complexes. Third, we introduce a new 
theoretical approach to normative legitimacy as residing in inter-institutional justificatory 
practices. It revolves around Rainer Forst’s ‘right to justification.’ Fourth, we argue that regime 
complexes put in place political opportunity structures which advance inter-institutional 
justifications and thereby facilitate normative progress in global governance. The conclusion 




Why the Dominant Approach to the Normative Legitimacy of International 
Institutions is Incomplete 
The case of public health-related intellectual property rights exemplifies that contemporary 
international institutions do not operate in isolation but create and are subject to positive and 
negative spillovers (Johnson and Urpelainen 2012). Positive spillovers emerge if one 
international institution supports a separately established international institution in achieving its 
governance objective (Johnson and Urpelainen 2012, 646). Several conventions adopted within 
the International Labor Organization (ILO), for example, reduce incentives for trafficking in 
persons and thus support the governance objective of the UN Trafficking Protocol. The latter, in 
turn, supports the governance objective of the ILO because preventing human trafficking reduces 
forced labor practices (Gómez-Mera 2016, 584). Negative spillovers, by contrast, arise if one 
international institution adversely affects or undermines the ability of another international 
institution to reach its governance objective (Johnson and Urpelainen 2012, 646). International 
institutions that facilitate transnational transport, such as the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), for example, undermine the 
governance objective of international institutions devoted to protecting the climate (Oberthür 
2003). And the governance objective of the WTO to facilitate transboundary trade adversely 
affects the governance objective of the World Food Program to promote food security (Margulis 
2018). 
These examples are not anomalous but point to the ubiquity of functional spillovers in 
contemporary global governance (Alter and Raustiala 2018; Gehring and Faude 2013). 
Functional spillovers result from the distinct trajectory on which world politics became 
institutionalized after World War II. As envisioned by neofunctionalists, states gradually 
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promoted the institutionalization of world politics by establishing sector-specific international 
institutions whose design followed functional needs (Haas 1964, chapter 1). This dynamic was 
partly fueled by the fact that, due to functional spillovers, gains from institutionalizing 
cooperation in one issue-area (e.g. financial and monetary affairs) could only be reaped fully, if 
cooperation was also institutionalized in cognate issue-areas (e.g. trade). Put differently, it was 
partly driven by the desire to exploit positive spillovers (Haas 1958, chapter 8).  
This neofunctionalist account neglects that cooperation in one issue-area may also undermine 
cooperation in a contagious issue-area, if divergent governance objectives cannot be reconciled. 
Thus, neofunctionalism does not capture the negative spillovers that were caused by the 
proliferation of international institutions (see Drezner 2013). Our approach, by contrast, is not 
only able to capture negative spillovers, but also to problematize them from the perspective of 
normative legitimacy.3   
Their ubiquity in contemporary global governance notwithstanding, the dominant approach to the 
normative legitimacy of international institutions neglects both positive and negative spillovers. It 
adopts an institution-specific perspective which postulates that normative legitimacy is created 
exclusively within separately established international institutions that operate in isolation from 
each other (Grant and Keohane 2005; Moravcsik 2004; Zürn 2004). Grant and Keohane (2005, 
35–37), to take a prominent example, identify seven discrete accountability mechanisms, but 
none of them takes functional spillovers and relations among international organizations into 
account. To be sure, their mechanism of “supervisory accountability” “refers to relations between 
organizations,” but the organizations that the authors have in mind to hold international 
organizations accountable are “states” and “institutions within states” (Grant and Keohane 2005, 
 
3 Neofunctionalism does not in any way problematize the normative legitimacy of international institutions.   
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36). Moreover, whilst the mechanism of “peer accountability” “arises as the result of mutual 
evaluation of organizations by their counterparts”, these counterparts are thought to be NGOs 
(Grant and Keohane 2005, 37). 
Within the dominant approach, two perspectives on the normative legitimacy of stand-alone 
international institutions can be distinguished. The premise of the first perspective is that “[t]he 
justification for having global governance institutions is primarily if not exclusively 
instrumental” (Buchanan and Keohane 2006, 422). It stipulates that international institutions 
derive their normative legitimacy primarily, if not exclusively, from their ability to realize the 
global public interest, that is, by helping states to realize governance objectives that they are not 
able to realize unilaterally, such as mitigating climate change or facilitating financial stability 
(Buchanan and Keohane 2006, 422; Zürn 2004, 262–66). This perspective adopts an institution-
specific definition of the public interest (Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik 2009, 9–16). It 
implicitly assumes that the governance objectives pursued by international institutions are clearly 
separable and can be achieved without reflecting upon their interrelationships. 
The second perspective approaches the normative legitimacy of international institutions by 
referring to a set of principles inherent in democratic theory, such as accountability and 
transparency (Dahl 1999; Moravcsik 2004; Zürn 2000). Scholars subscribing to this perspective 
share the assumption that international institutions derive their normative legitimacy from how 
they organize their collective decision-making. Grant and Keohane (2005, 35), for example, 
argue that the legitimacy of international organizations depends on “charters or articles of 
agreement that specify the procedures by which they have to act to make their rulings 
authoritative.” In general, this strand of literature analyzes in how far collective decision-making 
within stand-alone international institutions realizes democratic principles or can be expected to 
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do so in the future (Zürn 2000). Whilst the first perspective adopts an institution-specific 
definition of the global public interest, this perspective puts forward an institution-specific 
definition of global democracy. By implication, it neglects how functional spillovers affect the 
democratic quality of international institutions and, thus, their normative legitimacy. Moravcsik 
(2004: 338–48), to take a prominent example, develops a framework to analyze the democratic 
deficit in world politics that clearly applies to single international organizations. Consequently, 
he applies his framework to one international organization - the European Union (EU) - which he 
clearly conceives of as a stand-alone institution (Moravcsik 2004, 348–61). And Dahl, to take 
another example, offers “several reasons for believing that whatever kind of government may 
prevail in international organizations it will not be recognizably democratic in any sense” (Dahl 
1999, 20; our emphasis). Lastly, the arguments put forward by Zürn apply to “both international 
institutions in general and the EU in particular” (Zürn 2000, 185–86).    
The capacity of both perspectives to adequately assess the normative legitimacy of contemporary 
international institutions is incomplete. Both perspectives neglect that contemporary global 
governance is not merely the product of sector-specific international institutions but also emerges 
from their interactions (Weiss and Wilkinson 2014). The first perspective fails to reflect that, due 
to the ubiquity of functional spillovers, contemporary international institutions help collective 
actors to reach interdependent governance objectives that need to be balanced against each other 
(Fischer-Lescano and Teubner 2004). By implication, it fails to capture that what constitutes the 
global public interest is constantly contested not only within but also across separately 
established international institutions (cf. Grant and Keohane 2005, 38). In areas of overlap, the 
positions on how the global public interest ought to be defined differ among the proponents of 
diverging governance objectives. That is, collective actors disagree on how diverging governance 
objectives ought to be balanced. Among transnational human rights and environmentalist 
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activists, for example, it is a widespread criticism that international economic institutions 
subordinate environmental and consumer protection as well as human and labor rights to liberal 
economic goals (Bernstein 2005, 141). In short, no sector-specific international institution can 
unilaterally define the global public interest. 
The second perspective fails to capture the relevance of negative spillovers from the perspective 
of democratic theory. Negative spillovers imply that collective decision-making within one 
international institution not only undermines the ability of another international institution to 
reach its governance objective, but also adversely affects collective actors and individuals. For 
example, the anti-terrorism policy of the United Nations Security Council not only undermined 
the governance objective of international human rights institutions, but - through its “targeted 
sanction list” - also violated the rights of individuals that human rights institutions seek to protect 
(Morse and Keohane 2014, 395–98). From the perspective of democratic theory those affected by 
the negative spillovers of international institutions should be part of the collective decision-
making processes that produce them. 
In sum, notwithstanding the fact that, in contemporary global governance, it is hard to think of an 
international institution that is not part of a regime complex, the dominant approach to their 
normative legitimacy conceives of international institutions as if they were stand-alone. 
A New Analytical Perspective on Normative Legitimacy: International 
Institutions Embedded in Regime Complexes  
Since functional spillovers are ubiquitous in contemporary global governance, we posit that our 
assessments of the normative legitimacy of international institutions should be sensitive to inter-
institutional influences. We therefore develop a theoretical approach which enables IR scholars to 
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assess how negative spillovers affect the normative legitimacy of separately established but 
functionally overlapping international institutions. Adopting the NIA, we, firstly, conceive of 
international institutions as key sources of asymmetric power. That is, we hold that any 
international institution systematically privileges specific types of collective actors over others. 
Secondly, we conceive of international institutions as embedded in regime complexes, which 
feature rule overlap among separately established international institutions. We stipulate that 
every regime complex establishes a new political opportunity structure which facilitates 
countering the asymmetric power that individual institutions systematically grant specific types 
of collective actors (cf. Farrell and Newman 2016, 716). 
 
Diverging governance objectives and asymmetric power  
All international institutions are established to influence the behavior of relevant actors in order 
to achieve a particular governance objective such as international financial stability or the 
protection of human rights (Oberthür and Gehring 2006, 9). By implication, any international 
institution systematically privileges those collective actors that pursue its own governance 
objective over those who contest it by referring to diverging governance objectives pursued by 
overlapping international institutions. In that sense, international institutions are a source of 
asymmetric power (Farrell and Newman 2016, 716).  
Within regime complexes composed of international institutions from at least two different 
international regimes, the ways in which institutions seek to influence the behavior of relevant 
actors diverge. As a consequence, clashes between collective actors pursuing diverging 
governance objectives emerge. By institutionalizing and channeling the fight for dominance 
between those actors, regime complexes create political opportunity structures which enable 
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balancing the asymmetric power relationships prevalent within single international institutions. 
Within the refugee regime complex, for example, collective actors operating within international 
institutions regulating global mobility (that is, refugees, labor migration, and travel) interact with 
collective actors operating within international institutions devoted to humanitarian assistance, 
international security, human rights and development (Betts 2009). 
  
Rule overlap and decentralized political opportunity structures 
Since rule overlap is their defining feature, regime complexes decentralize the political 
opportunity structures within which collective actors operate in contemporary global governance 
(cf. Farrell and Newman 2016, 722; Alter and Raustiala 2018, 331–33). The NIA, however, 
hitherto focuses primarily on “rule overlap between different national jurisdictions,” (Farrell and 
Newman 2016, 713) and on overlap “of domestic and global authorities” (Farrell and Newman 
2016, 714). This note, by contrast, foregrounds rule overlap among global authorities. We hold 
that, if the NIA wants to deliver on its ambition to develop “the basis for a systemic account of 
world politics” (Farrell and Newman 2016, 716), it needs to take regime complexes, which have 
been described as the “signature feature of twenty-first century international cooperation” (Alter 
and Raustiala 2018, 345) more systematically into account. 
A political opportunity structure is defined in social movement studies as “consistent – but not 
necessarily formal, permanent, or national – dimensions of the political environment which either 
encourage or discourage actors from using collective action” (Tarrow 1994). Any political 
opportunity structure is composed of formal institutions which serve as “discursive arenas” 
(Kriesi 2004). It determines how those that are dissatisfied with a given institutional status quo 
can collectively contest it. “Open structures” which are decentralized and enable easy access to 
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decision-making are distinguished from “closed structures” which are centralized and restrain 
access (Kriesi 2004, 69–70). The proliferation of regime complexes has decentralized the 
political opportunity structures in global governance which have traditionally revolved around 
single international institutions. It enables collective actors that are affected by the negative 
spillovers of an international institution to use a separately established international institution in 
order to contest these spillovers. Thus, the elemental institutions of regime complexes serve as 
discursive arenas that enable communicative processes geared toward diverging governance 
objectives. They provide sets of references “to which actors can relate in their communicative 
interactions” (Risse 2002, 607). Thus, regime complexes are contested sides of global governance 
(Muzaka 2011).  
 
Substantive Linkage and Cooperation 
The opportunity structures established by regime complexes enable collective actors to 
purposefully connect the interrelated governance objectives pursued within separately established 
international institutions (Gehring and Faude 2014). That is, collective actors may establish a 
substantive linkage among the diverging governance objectives of these institutions (cf. Haas 
1980).4 As exemplified by the Doha Declaration, actors that establish a substantive linkage 
understand the governance objectives of separately established institutions as interlinked and re-
conceptualize them in a more encompassing way (cf. Haas 1980, 372; 374). In doing so, they use 
the political opportunity structures put in place by regime complexes not only to contest, but also 
to mitigate negative spillovers. 
 
4 In its original meaning, the concept of substantive linkages refers to linking issues in one international regime 
(Haas 1980, 374). 
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A Forstian Approach to Normative Legitimacy in Global Governance 
In order to grasp from a theoretical perspective how their embeddedness into regime complexes 
affects the normative legitimacy of international institutions, we draw on the political philosophy 
of Rainer Forst (2011; 2015). He holds that the term normative legitimacy does not contain any 
normative power on its own but is normatively dependent. That is, according to Forst (2015, 
188–90), normative legitimacy depends on other, deeper, resources which vary in their idealistic 
grounding. Against this backdrop, he suggests that no person and no institution, but only a 
distinct type of social interaction is able to yield normative legitimacy via the production of 
normatively valid justifications (Forst 2011, 262). A Forstian approach therefore implies that the 
normative legitimacy of international institutions is created via a distinct type of social interaction 
within which institutionalized norms, rules and decisions are elaborated, justified, contested, and 
defended. The central question for this notion of normative legitimacy is how the normative 
orders established by international institutions are justified to the people living under them. That 
is, from a Forstian perspective, the normative orders established by international institutions are 
understood as orders of justification. As such, they pre-suppose and generate justifications. Thus, 
a Forstian approach conceives of justifications as enshrined in the collectively binding norms, 
rules and decisions adopted within international institutions (see also Steffek 2003).  
In global governance, justifications may be constructed through various types of social 
interaction, from power-based bargaining to norm-guided interaction to truth-seeking arguing 
(Risse 2000). However, from a Forstian perspective, key is not which type of social interaction 
leads to a given justification. Rather, two criteria are applied to identify normatively valid 
justifications: reciprocity and generality. Reciprocity implies “that none of the parties concerned 
may claim certain rights or privileges they deny to others and that the relevance and force of the 
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claims at issue are not determined one-sidedly”. Generality requires that “those affected have an 
equal right to demand justifications” (Forst 2011, 258). Taken together, these two criteria 
constitute the right to justification which implies “a qualified veto right against any norms and 
practices that cannot be justified reciprocally and generally” (Forst 2011, 259).  
Applied to global governance, the “right to justification” requires the normative orders 
established by sector-specific international institutions to be justified in two ways: first, vis-à-vis 
those that are subjected to them (institution-specific justification);5 second, vis-à-vis those that 
are affected by them and therefore ought to recognize them from outside (inter-institutional 
justification).  
The criterion of reciprocity implies that, from a Forstian perspective on normative legitimacy, it 
is important whether the legitimate interests of those not represented in collective decision-
making but affected by its negative spillovers are considered in the process. That is, the criterion 
of reciprocity asks any international institution to justify the negative spillovers it creates. Such 
justifications may be developed not only by truth-seeking or norm-guided interaction but also by 
way of power-based bargaining. However, we may expect their normative quality to vary across 
the three types of social interaction.   
In sum, a Forstian approach implies that the normative orders established by international 
institutions can be conceived as arbitrary rule or domination, if they are not reciprocally and 
generally justified. This is the case, if exclusive institutional structures close the space for 
contestation. From this perspective, any absence of institutional structures that enable actors to 
call prevailing justifications into question is “political domination” because it prevents the 
construction of reciprocal and general justifications (Forst 2011, 249–50). A Forstian approach 
 
5 On institution-specific justifications, see Steffek (2003).  
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therefore requires global governance to develop institutional structures which enable the 
proponents of diverging governance objectives enshrined in overlapping international institutions 
to put forward, contest and defend reciprocal and general justifications. Put differently, a Forstian 
approach requires global governance to facilitate the right to justification to be exercised across 
overlapping normative orders and, thus, beyond institution-specific justificatory narratives. By 
implication, it asks IR scholarship to integrate the questions of whether, how and to what degree 
global governance enables the contestation of institution-specific justificatory narratives when 
assessing its normative legitimacy (Forst 2015, chapters 1 and 2). 
 
How Regime Complexes Enable Normative Progress in Global Governance 
As long as international institutions operate separately, individual governance objectives define 
the normative orders around which “actors’ expectations converge in a[ny] given area of 
international relations” (Krasner 1982, 186). By implication, social interaction revolves 
exclusively around individual governance objectives. As a result, the normative orders 
established and reproduced by international institutions pre-suppose and generate justifications 
that are fundamentally biased towards their own governance objectives. In other words, 
international institutions establish institution-specific orders of justification within which 
institution-specific justificatory narratives constrain social interaction. Such justificatory 
narratives neglect that “beliefs of fact and causation”, “rights and obligations” as well as “specific 
prescriptions or proscriptions for action” diverge across regimes (Krasner 1982, 186). 
As soon as international institutions become elements of regime complexes, the context “within 
which decisions are made and rules are adopted” gets enlarged (Helfer 2009, 39). Regime 
complexes establish governance arrangements which revolve around the diverging governance 
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objectives of their elemental institutions as normative reference points. They enable dispute and, 
possibly, reflection about prevailing standards of justification. In other words, inherent in regime 
complexes is an interplay of the diverging justificatory narratives constructed within their 
elemental institutions.  
By enabling actors that pursue different governance objectives to exchange justifications, regime 
complexes facilitate the balancing of the asymmetric power that individual institutions 
systematically grant specific types of collective actors (cf. Farrell and Newman 2016, 716). On 
the one hand, dominant actors within each elemental institution face inter-institutional pressure to 
justify their actions also with reference to the governance objectives of other elemental 
institutions. On the other hand, dissatisfied actors (in particular those affected by negative 
spillovers) gain the opportunity to call institution-specific justificatory narratives into question by 
demanding reciprocal (inter-institutional) justifications of negative spillovers.6 In short, due to 
rule overlap, regime complexes weaken the capacity of dominant actors to constrain discursive 
spaces and empower actors that are affected by negative spillovers. From a Forstian perspective, 
they establish political opportunity structures that facilitate reciprocal (inter-institutional) 
justifications.  
Actors that are affected by the negative spillovers emanating from various development projects 
funded by the World Bank, for example, may draw on international human rights treaties to 
demand a justification for these spillovers (Heupel 2017). And environmentalists affected by 
WTO regulations, to take another example, may resort to international environmental institutions 
in order to ask the WTO to justify the negative spillovers it exerts on the protection of the 
environment (Gehring 2011).  
 
6 Given that we conceive of international institutions as sites of asymmetric power, we expect these actors to be 
marginalized in the institution that creates negative spillovers. 
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Reciprocal justifications are produced, if prevailing institution-specific justificatory narratives are 
not only called into question within inter-institutional dynamics but gradually replaced by 
“reflexive justifications.” Such a dynamic implies, first, that institution-specific justifications of 
norms, rules and decisions are challenged and overcome and, second, that justifications are being 
acknowledged inter-institutionally (reciprocally) (Forst 2015, chapter 8). This dynamic amounts 
to the construction of a substantive linkage between the governance objectives pursued by the 
elemental institutions of regime complexes. From a Forstian perspective, a substantive linkage 
institutionalizes an inter-institutional (reciprocal) justification. It comes into being through a 
collectively binding norm, rule or decision that interrelates the governance objectives pursued by 
these institutions. If a substantive linkage is in place, the “relevance and force of the claims at 
issue are not determined one-sidedly” (Forst 2011, 258) but by taking diverging governance 
objectives into account within collective decision-making. The Doha Declaration, for example, 
constructs a substantive linkage between WTO and WHO by interrelating the protection of 
intellectual property rights to the protection of public health. In doing so, it mitigates the negative 
spillovers that the WTO imposes on the WHO. Another substantive linkage has been constructed 
between the governance objective of the World Food Program (WFP) to enhance food security 
and the governance objective of the WTO to facilitate transboundary trade. The construction of 
this linkage responds to concerns within the WFP and other UN agencies that the trade 
liberalization facilitated by the WTO compromises food security (Margulis 2013, 61). To 
intervene in the trade negotiations, the WFP placed an advertisement in the Financial Times on 
the first day of the 2005 WTO Ministerial in Hong Kong. The advertisement bluntly raised 
concerns that WTO trade regulations could have devastating effects on food security (Margulis 
2018, 16). By problematizing negative spillovers, it put pressure on the WTO to justify its trade 
regulations against the backdrop of food security. After a harsh political battle, it was decided ten 
19 
 
years later, at the 2015 Nairobi Ministerial, that, in cases of emergency, establishing food security 
trumps facilitating international trade (Ministerial Decision on Export Competition, 
WT/MIN(15)/45, No. 22–32). More precisely, the Ministerial Decision stipulates that 
humanitarian agencies, and not the WTO, are the legitimate institutions to decide what constitutes 
a legitimate food aid emergency (Margulis 2018, 17).   
It is important to emphasize that justifications can feature varying degrees of reciprocity. If an 
elemental institution of a regime complex, for example, unequivocally subordinates the 
governance objective of an overlapping institution to its own governance objective and thus 
marginalizes its rival, the level of reciprocity is low. By contrast, if diverging governance 
objectives are inter-related in a fine-grained and equitable way, for example by defining under 
which circumstances which governance objective is to be given priority, the level of reciprocity is 
high. Thus, we do not conceive of justifications in binary terms. That is, we do not conceive of 
them as being either one-sided or reciprocal. Rather, we submit that justifications can assume 
varying degrees of reciprocity. Importantly, however, our Forstian approach suggests that also a 
low level of reciprocity constitutes (small) normative progress compared to the completely one-
sided (that is, institution-specific) orders of justification constructed within international 
institutions. Thus, even turf battles between elemental institutions of regime complexes enhance 
reciprocity as long as they do not reject diverging governance objective(s) altogether. Normative 
progress is completely absent only if the elemental institutions of regime complexes justify their 
norms, rules and decisions as if they were stand-alone institutions. 
A Forstian approach suggests that regime complexes increase the ability of their elemental 
institutions to critically revise how they achieve their governance objectives (Buchanan and 
Keohane 2006, 427). To the degree that “checks and balances are mechanisms designed to 
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prevent action that oversteps legitimate boundaries by requiring the cooperation of actors with 
different institutional interests” (Grant and Keohane 2005, 30), regime complexes put in place a 
rudimentary system of informal checks and balances among separately established, but 
functionally overlapping international institutions. They effectuate that the legitimate boundaries 
of institutionalized political action in global governance are defined not only within single 
institutions, but also inter-institutionally. 
In sum, our Forstian approach to normative legitimacy implies, first, that international institutions 
tend to produce normative orders that neglect negative spillovers and, by implication, the 
legitimate interests of those not represented in their collective decision-making. As a result, they 
violate Forst’s criterion of reciprocity. It implies, second, that, as elements of regime complexes, 
international institutions induce social interaction that tends to take negative spillovers into 
account, although in different ways and, thus, with varying degrees of normative legitimacy. In 
short, regime complexes put in place the opportunity structures that enable collective actors to 
develop inter-institutional justifications. In doing so, they enable normative progress in global 
governance. It is, however, an empirical question how considerable this progress is (see 
Conclusion).  
 
Where to Look for Inter-institutional Justifications?  
Inter-institutional justifications are developed in two types of institutional bodies. First, 
established decision-making bodies of international institutions may put forward inter-
institutional justifications by taking the governance objectives of other elemental institutions into 
account when adopting their decisions. The dispute settlement body of the GATT/WTO system, 
for example, has in various decisions dealt with the contentious question of environmentally 
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motivated trade restrictions (Gehring 2011). These decisions determine the scope of those 
GATT/WTO rules that allow restricting international trade for environmental purposes. Initially, 
the dispute settlement body rejected “environmentally motivated trade restrictions that were in 
conflict with the GATT non-discrimination obligations” (Gehring 2011, 234). More precisely, it 
argued that “market access for goods could become subject to an increasing number of 
conflicting policy requirements for the same product and this would rapidly lead to the end of the 
WTO multilateral trading system” (World Trade Organization 1998, para. 7.45).  
In the “shrimp/turtle case”, however, the WTO Appellate Body significantly changed the 
GATT/WTO jurisprudence on environmentally motivated trade restrictions. It did so by arguing 
that “the world trade system is directed at ensuring that the interests of the importing state to 
enact meaningful environmental protection measures are weighed against the interests of the 
exporting states to accede to the import market.” Against this backdrop, it “developed a number 
of criteria to which trade restricting domestic measures must conform in order to be compatible 
with GATT rules” (Gehring 2011, 245). In doing so, the WTO Appellate Body established a 
substantive linkage between the governance objective of the WTO and the governance objectives 
of various international environmental institutions. Thereby, it has reduced negative spillovers 
and increased reciprocity in the regime complex of trade and the environment. 
In a similar vein, the World Bank has been dealing for decades with the question of how the 
projects it funds affect individual rights enshrined in international human rights treaties (Krisch, 
Corradini, and Reimers 2020). Its initial approach to human rights drew on the “political 
prohibition” rule in the Articles of Agreement which provides that “the Bank and its officers shall 
not interfere in the political affairs of any member.” Over time, however, the World Bank has 
started to problematize the negative spillovers its projects exert on human rights. Not only was 
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the World Bank Inspection Panel established in 1993 and the Environmental and Social 
Framework (ESF) launched in 2018 but also World Bank lawyers have increasingly relied on 
international human rights institutions in their legal interpretations (Krisch, Corradini, and 
Reimers 2020). In stark contrast to the initial approach, one General Counsel even argued that 
“the Articles of Agreement permit, and in some cases require the Bank to recognize the human 
rights dimensions of its development policies and activities” (Danino 2006). In sum, the World 
Bank has, over time, increased reciprocity by becoming more receptive of the norms and rules 
enshrined in international human rights treaties. In fact, it has established a substantive linkage 
between diverging governance objectives. By implication, it has reduced negative spillovers.    
Second, inter-institutional justifications may emerge within inter-institutional bodies that are 
established with the explicit purpose of mediating inter-institutional tensions and conflicts. 
Within the regime complex for hazardous substances and activities, for example, the Inter-
Organization for the Sound Management of Chemicals (IOMC) assumes such a role. The IOMC 
brings together representatives of various institutions which meet twice a year to coordinate their 
activities on chemicals management and recommend common policies for all elemental 
institutions (Dunoff 2012). In particular, they consider how the regulation of chemicals 
management affects the governance objectives pursued by the elemental institutions of the 
complex, be they food security, environmental protection, or industrial development. The various 
“joint working groups and expert groups” established by the IMO and the ILO are further 
examples of such inter-institutional bodies. Within the “Joint IMO/ILO Ad Hoc Expert Working 
Group on Liability and Compensation regarding Claims for Death, Personal Injury and 
Abandonment of Seafarers”, the “Joint IMO/ILO Ad Hoc Expert Working Group on the Fair 
Treatment of Seafarers in the Event of a Maritime Accident”, “the Joint ILO/IMO Working 
Group on Medical Examinations of Seafarers and Ships' Medicine Chests” and others, inter-
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institutional justifications that relate the social protection of seafarers (a governance objective 
pursued by the ILO) to the protection of the maritime environment (a governance objective 
pursued by the IMO) are put forward (Dunoff 2016, 69). 
What About Democracy? 
Their ability to facilitate the construction of inter-institutional justifications notwithstanding, all 
of the aforementioned institutional bodies are highly exclusive. Their composition of political, 
judicial, and technical experts is consequential for our Forstian approach to the normative 
legitimacy of international institutions. It implies that the generality of the justifications put 
forward in these bodies is highly restricted, no matter how reciprocal they are. As we lay out in 
Section 3, generality is the second criterion that Forst uses to identify normatively valid 
justifications. It captures the relationship between those adopting collectively binding decisions 
within international institutions and those affected by them. More precisely, generality requires 
that “those affected have an equal right to demand justifications” (Forst 2011, 258). By 
implication, it asks international institutions to open-up their exclusive institutional structures, 
including those that put forward inter-institutional justifications. In short, the criterion of 
generality calls for the institutionalization of democratic governance structures. To the degree 
that representatives of civil society and, indeed, citizens contribute to the construction of inter-
institutional justifications, not only their reciprocity but also their generality is enhanced. 
How does the absence of democratic governance structures affect our argument that regime 
complexes facilitate normative progress in global governance? Democracy can be defined as a 
“system of governance which requires that individuals can participate as equals in the collective 
decision-making that affects their lives” (Kuyper 2014b, 180). Thus, global governance can be 
described as democratic if all those significantly affected by it enjoy “equal and maximal 
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inclusion” in international institutions (Kuyper 2014a, 637). While we use the criterion of 
reciprocity to suggest that regime complexes enhance the normative legitimacy of global 
governance by facilitating inter-institutional justifications, we do not use the criterion of 
generality to suggest that regime complexes enhance the ability of citizens to demand 
justifications. Thus, our argument that regime complexes facilitate normative progress in global 
governance relies exclusively on their ability to facilitate inter-institutional justifications. 
However, our Forstian approach is not only able to make visible the normative progress that is 
achieved within exclusive institutional bodies by its criterion of reciprocity, but also to criticize 
the lack of democratic structures by its criterion of generality.  
In fact, our Forstian approach is largely compatible with the “bottom-up” deliberative approach 
to global democratization developed by James Bohman (2010). Similar to us, Bohman (2010, 
438) observes that existing institutions “often involve restrictions in the availability of relevant 
perspectives,” a fact that he (like us) traces back to a lacking diversity of actors. Analogous to 
this theory note, he argues that, to enable mutually checking procedures, decision-making power 
should be dispersed “across overlapping and differentiated institutions” (Bohman 2010, 441). In 
contrast to our emphasis on inter-institutional justifications (reciprocity), however, Bohman 
foregrounds the integration of civil society and the public sphere into collective decision-making 
(generality).  
Our approach is distinct, however, from John Dryzek’s (2006) approach to democratizing global 
governance. Whereas Dryzek (2006, 158) emphasizes discourses within the general public that 
lack a “formalized connection to binding collective decisions”, we focus on justifications put 
forward within formal international institutions. Nevertheless, Dryzek (2006, 18), like us, points 
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to the importance of constellations in which different (hegemonic) discourses clash and 
emphasizes the democratic potential of engagement across multiple discourses.  
In general, Bohman, Dryzek and other proponents of global deliberative democracy foreground 
discursive processes and good reasons without elaborating precisely on the institutional 
arrangements (whether they exist in the real world or not) that may enable those types of social 
interaction (Zürn 2016, 93). Our Forstian approach, in contrast, emphasizes the legitimacy-
enhancing potential of an institutional arrangement – the regime complex – which not only exists 
in the real world, but is even increasingly prevalent in global governance.  
 
Conclusion and Future Research 
As the NIA suggests, political contestation takes place in multiple and overlapping venues 
(Farrell and Newman 2016, 724).7 To accommodate this phenomenon, we develop a new 
theoretical approach to the normative legitimacy of international institutions which conceives of 
them as embedded in regime complexes. In contrast to the dominant approach, we posit that the 
normative legitimacy of any international institution is affected by the effects it creates outside of 
its own governance domain.  
Drawing on the political philosophy of Rainer Forst, our approach conceives of normative 
legitimacy as residing in inter-institutional justificatory practices as a distinct type of social 
interaction. Against this backdrop, we argue that regime complexes enhance the normative 
legitimacy of global governance by increasing the ability of affected actors to contest the 
negative spillovers international institutions create in governance domains beyond their own. In 
 
7 However, the Farrell and Newman only very briefly touch upon the normative concerns raised by the NIA (Farrell 
and Newman 2016, 730).  
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doing so, they enable inter-institutional and, therefore, more encompassing forms of justification 
than individual international institutions. In other words, regime complexes enlarge the context 
within which international institutions are expected to justify their decisions compared to a 
counterfactual situation – commonly assumed by existing research – in which they operate in 
isolation.  
They let institution-specific justificatory narratives compete against each other for the 
determination of the global public interest. Thus, their embeddedness in regime complexes 
affects how international institutions justify their norms, rules and decisions. It therefore makes a 
difference whether, for example, the WTO is a stand-alone institution or an elemental institution 
of the regime complex for public-health related intellectual property rights. Since inter-
institutional justifications concern not merely technical difficulties or implementation problems 
but fundamental normative conflicts, they are inherently political in nature. Regime complexes 
accommodate a “plurality of regulatory perspectives” which enables actors to interrelate 
diverging governance objectives (Dunoff 2012, 139). As the various empirical examples sketched 
in the note illustrate, the process of interrelating diverging governance objectives includes hard-
fought political battles. Our Forstian approach to the normative legitimacy of international 
institutions therefore incorporates conventional adversarial politics. 
This theory note prepares the ground for a new research agenda on the normative legitimacy of 
international institutions as embedded in regime complexes. Since negative spillovers may be 
justified in different ways, the inter-institutional justifications put forward within regime 
complexes inevitably possess different degrees of normative legitimacy. We do not conceive of 
justifications in binary terms, that is, as being either one-sided or reciprocal. Rather, we assume 
that they can possess varying degrees of reciprocity. Against this backdrop, the next step in 
27 
 
advancing knowledge on how their embeddedness in regime complexes affects the normative 
legitimacy of international institutions is a comparative empirical analysis of the reciprocal 
qualities of various regime complexes. Such a study would, firstly, analyze inter-institutional 
justifications which can be demanded by collective actors via critical public statements, reports, 
or even by establishing competing rules. Such actions are observable implications of a situation 
in which justifications developed within international institutions are not acknowledged inter-
institutionally. It would, secondly, analyze inter-institutional justifications which can be put 
forward within international institutions in order to nurture the belief in their legitimacy. In that 
case, inter-institutional justifications “are observable in official texts and public statements”, 
including “public justifications of institutional reforms, framing of IO policies, use of value-laden 
symbols, and other rhetorical measures” (Tallberg and Zürn 2019, 588).  
To the degree that the inter-related governance objectives of overlapping international institutions 
are taken into account in decision-making processes, and justifications of collectively binding 
decisions are being acknowledged inter-institutionally, normative progress is observable. The 
comparative empirical analysis of inter-institutional justifications within various regime 
complexes will help to develop a more fine-grained understanding of reciprocity. More 
importantly, it will enable us to capture the varying normative qualities of the inter-institutional 
justifications put forward within and across elemental institutions of regime complexes. As a 






Alter, Karen J., and Kal Raustiala. 2018. “The Rise of International Regime Complexity.” Annual 
Review of Law and Social Science 14 (1): 329–49. 
Benvenisti, Eyal, and George W. Downs. 2007. “The Empire's New Clothes: Political Economy 
and the Fragmentation of International Law.” Stanford Law Review 60 (2): 595–632. 
Bernstein, Steven. 2005. “Legitimacy in Global Environmental Governance.” Journal of 
International Law and International Relations 1 (1-2): 139–66. 
Betts, Alexander. 2009. “Institutional Proliferation and the Global Refugee Regime.” 
Perspectives on Politics 7 (01): 53–58.  
Bohman, James. 2010. “Democratising the global order: from communicative freedom to 
communicative power.” Review of International Studies 36 (02): 431–47.  
Buchanan, Allen, and Robert O. Keohane. 2006. “The Legitimacy of Global Governance 
Institutions.” Ethics & International Affairs 20 (4): 405–37. 
Dañino, Roberto. 2006. “Legal Opinion on Human Rights and the Work of the World Bank.” 
Accessed March 26, 2020. http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law-oxio/e215.013.1/law-
oxio-e215-regGroup-1law-oxio-e215-source.pdf. 
Drezner, Daniel. 2007. All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.   
Dryzek, John S. 2006. Deliberative Global Politics: Discourse and Democracy in a Divided 
World. Cambridge: Polity Press.   
Dunoff, Jeffrey L. 2012. “A new approach to regime interaction.” In Young 2012, 136–74. 
Dunoff, Jeffrey L. 2016. “How to Avoid Regime Collisions.” In Contested Regime Collisions: 
Norm Fragmentation in World Society, edited by Kerstin Blome, Andreas Fischer-Lescano, 
Hannah Franzki, Nora Markard, and Stefan Oeter, 49–87. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Farrell, Henry, and Abraham Newman. 2016. “The new interdependence approach: theoretical 
development and empirical demonstration.” Review of International Political Economy 23 (5): 
713–36. 
Faude, Benjamin, and Thomas Gehring. 2017. “Regime complexes as governance systems.” In 
Research Handbook on the Politics of International Law, edited by Wayne Sandholtz and 
Christopher A. Whytock, 176–203. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Fischer-Lescano, Andreas, and Gunther Teubner. 2004. “Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for 




Follesdal, Andreas. 2016. “Implications of contested multilateralism for global 
constitutionalism.” Global Constitutionalism 5 (3): 297–308.  
Forst, Rainer. 2011. The right to justification: Elements of a constructivist theory of justice. New 
directions in critical theory. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Forst, Rainer. 2015. Normativität und Macht: Zur Analyse sozialer Rechtfertigungsordnungen. 1. 
Aufl. Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft 2132. Berlin: Suhrkamp. 
Gehring, Thomas. 2011. “The Emerging Governance Structure on Trade and the Environment: 
from Disruption to Division of Labor.” In Institutional Interaction and Global Environmental 
Change: Interplay Management and Institutional Complexes, edited by Sebastian Oberthür and 
Olav S. Stokke, 227–44. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Gehring, Thomas, and Benjamin Faude. 2014. “A theory of emerging order within institutional 
complexes: How competition among regulatory international institutions leads to institutional 
adaptation and division of labor.” Review of International Organizations 9 (4): 471–98. 
Gehring, Thomas, and Benjamin Faude. 2013. “The dynamics of regime complexes: Micro-
foundations and Systemic Effects.” Global Governance 19 (1): 119–30.  
Gómez-Mera, Laura. 2016. “Regime complexity and global governance: The case of trafficking 
in persons.” European Journal of International Relations 22 (3): 566–95.  
Grant, Ruth W., and Robert O. Keohane. 2005. “Accountability and Abuses of Power in World 
Politics.” American Political Science Review 99 (1): 29–43. 
Haas, Ernst B. 1958. The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950–1957. 
London: Stevens & Sons Limited.   
Haas, Ernst B. 1964. Beyond the Nation-State. Functionalism and International Organizations. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press.  
Haas, Ernst B. 1980. “Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes.” World 
Politics 32 (3): 357–405. 
Helfer, Laurence R. 2009. “Regime Shifting in the International Intellectual Property System.” 
Perspectives on Politics 7 (1): 39–44. 
Heupel, Monika. 2017. “Human Rights Protection in World Bank Lending: Following the Lead 
of the US Congress.” In Protecting the Individual from International Authority. Human Rights 
in International Organizations, edited by Monika Heupel & Michael Zürn, 241-272. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.     
Johnson, Tana, and Johannes Urpelainen. 2012. “A Strategic Theory of Regime Integration and 
Separation.” International Organization 66 (4): 645–77. 
Keohane, Robert O., Stephen Macedo, and Andrew Moravcsik. 2009. “Democracy-Enhancing 
Multilateralism.” International Organization 63 (1): 1–31. 
30 
 
Krasner, Stephen D. 1982. “Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening 
variables.” International Organization 36 (2): 185–205.   
Kriesi, Hanspeter. 2004. “Political Context and Opportunity.” In The Blackwell Companion to 
Social Movements, edited by David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi, 67–90. 
Blackwell companions to sociology. Malden, Mass. Blackwell Publ. 
Krisch, Nico, Francesco Corradini, and Lucy Lu Reimers. 2020. Order at the Margins. The Legal 
Construction of Norm Collisions over Time. Global Constitutionalism. Forthcoming. 
Kuyper, Jonathan. 2014a. “Global Democratization and Regime Complexity.” European Journal 
of International Relations 20 (3): 620–46. 
Kuyper, Jonathan. 2014b. “The democratic potential of systemic pluralism.” Global 
Constitutionalism 3 (2): 170–99. 
Margulis, Matias E. 2013. “The Regime Complex for Food Security: Implications for the Global 
Hunger Challenge.” Global Governance 19 (1): 53–67. 
Margulis, Matias E. 2018. “Negotiating from the margins: how the UN shapes the rules of the 
WTO.” Review of International Political Economy 25 (3): 364–91. 
Moravcsik, Andrew. 2004. “Is There a ´Democratic Deficit` in World Politics? a Framework for 
Analysis.” Government & Opposition 39 (2): 336–63. 
Morse, Julia, and Robert O. Keohane. (2014). “Contested Multilateralism.” Review of 
International Organizations 9 (4): 385–412.  
Muzaka, Valbona. 2011. “Linkages, contests and overlaps in the global intellectual property 
rights regime.” European Journal of International Relations 17 (4): 755–76.   
Oberthür, Sebastian. 2003. “Institutional interaction to address greenhouse gas emissions from 
international transport: ICAO, IMO and the Kyoto Protocol.” Climate Policy 3 (3): 191–205.    
Oberthür, Sebastian, and Thomas Gehring. 2006. “Institutional Interaction in Global 
Environmental Governance: the Case of the Cartagena Protocol and the World Trade 
Organization.” Global Environmental Politics 6 (2): 1–31. 
Orsini, Amandine, Jean-Frédéric Morin, and Oran R. Young. 2013. “Regime Complexes: a Buzz, 
a Boom, or a Boost for Global Governance?” Global Governance 19 (1): 27–39. 
Raustiala, Kal, and David G. Victor. 2004. “The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources.” 
International Organization 58 (2): 277–309. 
Risse, Thomas. 2000. “"Let's Argue!". Communicative Action in World Politics.” International 
Organization 54 (1): 1–40. 
Risse, Thomas. 2002. “Constructivism and International Institutions: Toward Conversation 
Across Paradigms.” In Political Science: the State of the Discipline, edited by Ira Katznelson 
and Helen V. Milner, 597–623. New York, NY: Norton. 
31 
 
Sun, Haochen. 2004. “The Road to Doha and Beyond: Some Reflections on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health.” European Journal of International Law 15 (1): 123–150.  
Tallberg, Jonas, and Michael Zürn. 2019. “The legitimacy and legitimation of international 
organizations: introduction and framework.” Review of International Organizations 14 (4): 
581–606.  
Tarrow, Sidney. 1994. Power in Movement. Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
t’Hoen, Ellen. 2003. “TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to Essential Medicines: Seattle, 
Doha and Beyond.” In: Economics of AIDS and access to HIV-AIDS care in developing 
countries. Issues and challenges, edited by Jean-Paul Moatti, Tony Barnett and Benjamin 
Coriat, 40-68. Paris: ANRS. 
Weiss, Thomas G., and Rorden Wilkinson. 2014. “Rethinking Global Governance? Complexity, 
Authority, Power, Change.” International Studies Quarterly 58 (1): 207–15.  
Williams, Melissa S. 2009. “Citizenship as Agency Within Communities of Shared Fate.” In 
Unsettled Legitimacy: Political Community, Power, and Authority in a Global Era, edited by 
William D. Coleman and Steven F. Bernstein, 33–52. Globalization and autonomy. Vancouver: 
UBC Press. 
World Trade Organization. 1998. “United States Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products. Report of the Panel.”. 
World Trade Organization. 2001. “Doha Ministerial Declaration. Ministerial Conference, Fourth 
Session, Doha.”. 
WTO Decision. 2013. “Public stockholding for food security purposes: Ministerial decision of 7 
December 2013.” WT/MIN(13)/38 WT/L/913. 
Young, Margaret A., ed. 2012. Regime interaction in international law: Facing fragmentation. 
Cambridge, U.K., New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Zürn, Michael. 2000. “Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation-State: The EU and Other 
Insternational Institutions.” European Journal of International Relations 6 (2): 183–221. 
Zürn, Michael. 2004. “Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems.” Government & Opposition 
39 (2): 260–87. 
Zürn, Michael. 2016. “Survey Article: Four Models of a Global Order with a Cosmopolitan 
Intent: An Empirical Assessment.” Journal of Political Philosophy 24 (1): 88–119.    
 
 
